Brashier, N. M., & Marsh, E. J. (2020). Judging truth. Annual review of psychology, 71(1), 499-515. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050807


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En principe, le ou les auteurs en question devraient bientôt présenter une meilleure version.


Abstract des auteur·trice·s

Deceptive claims surround us, embedded in fake news, advertisements, political propaganda, and rumors. How do people know what to believe? Truth judgments reflect inferences drawn from three types of information: base rates, feelings, and consistency with information retrieved from memory. First, people exhibit a bias to accept incoming information, because most claims in our environments are true. Second, people interpret feelings, like ease of processing, as evidence of truth. And third, people can (but do not always) consider whether assertions match facts and source information stored in memory. This three-part framework predicts specific illusions (e.g., truthiness, illusory truth), offers ways to correct stubborn misconceptions, and suggests the importance of converging cues in a post-truth world, where falsehoods travel further and faster than the truth.


Introduction

Pour elles, il y a des informations qui "feel false" et d'autres qui "feel true". Quelques exemples:

  • A camel's hump stores water. (faux)
  • Albert Einstein failed math in school (faux)
  • Suicide rates peak during the holidays (faux)
  • An octopus has three hearts (vrai)
  • Anne Frank and Martin Luther King, Jr. were born in the same year (vrai)
  • The unicorn is Scotland's national animal (vrai)

Avec cet article, les autrices couvrent le processus pour déterminer les "false claims" (fausses déclarations) ; c'est-à-dire si les gens pensent que l'information est objectivement vraie ou fausse (donc pas ce qui touche aux attitudes et à la persuasion).

The construction of truth

Inferring truth from base rates

Inferring truth from feelings

Inferring truth with consistency with memory

Summary

Correcting misconceptions

Conclusion

Truth judgement par Brashier et Nash
Les scores C mesurent la tendance générale à dire « vrai », tandis que les scores d′ reflètent la capacité à distinguer les affirmations vraies des fausses. Les lignes pointillées indiquent les interactions décrites par des recherches antérieures.